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Abstract
This paper reports evidence that individual investors in Indian equities hold better
performing portfolios as they become more experienced in the equity market. Expe-
rienced investors tilt their portfolios protably towards value stocks and stocks with
low turnover, but these tilts do not fully explain their good performance. Experienced
investors also tend to have lower turnover and disposition bias. These behaviors, as
well as underdiversication, diminish when investors experience poor returns result-
ing from them, consistent with models of reinforcement learning. Indian stocks held
by experienced, well diversied, low-turnover and low-disposition-bias investors deliver
higher average returns even controlling for a standard set of stock-level characteristics.
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Its a little better all the time. (It cant get no worse.)
Lennon and McCartney, Getting Better,1967.
1 Introduction
Equities play an important role in normative theories of household investment. Because
stocks have historically o¤ered a risk premium, households with no initial exposure to the
asset class can benet from holding at least some stocks. The optimal equity allocation
depends on market conditions, the equity premium, and many details of the households
nancial situation, including the households risk aversion and other risk exposures, but
typical calibrations suggest it is substantial at least for households with su¢ cient wealth
to justify paying the xed cost of equity market participation (Campbell and Viceira 2002,
Campbell 2006, Siegel 2007).
Direct investment in stocks is not straightforward, however, and households can lose
much of the benet of stock market participation if they engage in certain widely-studied in-
vestment behaviors. Three such investment behaviors can be costly even in a market where
all individual stocks have the same risk and the same expected return. First, underdiver-
sication increases portfolio risk without increasing return (Blume and Friend 1975, Kelly
1995, Calvet et al. 2007). Second, high turnover of an equity portfolio leads to high trading
costs (Odean 1999, Barber and Odean 2000). Third, selling stocks that have appreciated
while holding those that have depreciated a tendency known as the disposition e¤ect
increases the present value of tax obligations by accelerating the realization of capital gains
and deferring the realization of o¤setting losses (Shefrin and Statman 1985, Odean 1998).
In a market where expected returns di¤er across stocks, it is also possible for households
to lose by picking underperforming stocks. They may do this by taking risk exposures that
are negatively compensated, for example by holding growth stocks in a market with a value
premium, or by adopting a short-term contrarian investment strategy (perhaps driven by
the disposition e¤ect) in a market with momentum where outperforming stocks continue to
outperform for a period of time. If these style tilts do not o¤set other risks of the household,
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they are welfare reducing.1 Alternatively, households may lose by trading with informed
counterparties in a market that is not strong-form e¢ cient, and thus rewards investors who
possess private information (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, OHara 2003).
Households can control suboptimal investment behaviors in several ways. They can hold
mutual funds as a way to gain equity exposure without trading stocks directly. This, how-
ever, may result in trade-o¤s between householdstendencies to engage in these behaviors,
the level of fees charged by intermediaries, and the possibility that mutual fund managers
may themselves be susceptible to these behaviors. Households can also learn from observ-
ing overall patterns in the market, or from their own investment experience (Nicolosi et al.
2009, Seru et al. 2010, Malmendier and Nagel 2011, 2012). In this paper we report evidence
that learning from experience is important. Importantly, however, we do not claim that
such learning is rational. Instead, it may reect reinforcement learning, in which personal
experiences are overweighted relative to broader patterns of evidence in historical data.
Our study uses data from the Indian equity market. For several reasons this is an ideal
laboratory for studying learning among equity investors. First, India is an emerging market
whose capitalization and investor base have been growing rapidly. In such a population of
relatively inexperienced investors, learning may be faster and easier to detect than in better
established equity markets. Second, as discussed more fully below, mutual funds account
for a relatively small value share of Indian individualsequity exposure, so it is meaningful
to measure the diversication of directly held stock portfolios. The prevalence of direct
equity ownership also implies that it is more important for Indian investors to develop the
skills necessary to own stocks directly than it is in a mature market with a large mutual
fund share. Third, India has electronic registration of equity ownership, allowing us to
track the complete ownership history of listed Indian stocks over a decade. The relatively
long time dimension of our panel allows us to measure investorsperformance using their
1This is true whether risk prices are driven by fundamentals or by investor sentiment (the preferences of
unsophisticated investors for certain types of stocks). In a model with fundamental risks it may be more
likely that householdsnon-equity risk exposures justify equity positions with low expected returns, but if
this is not the case such positions still reduce household welfare just as they would in a sentiment-driven
model.
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realized returns, a method that is vulnerable to common shocks when applied to a short
panel. Moreover, our data are monthly, and this relatively high frequency allows us to more
accurately measure important determinants of performance such as momentum investing
and turnover.
A limitation of our Indian data is that we have almost no information about the de-
mographic characteristics of investors. Thus we cannot follow the strategies, common in
household nance, of proxying nancial sophistication using information about investors
age, education, and occupation (Calvet et al. 2007, 2009a), their IQ test scores (Grinblatt
and Keloharju 2011), or survey evidence about their nancial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell
2007). Instead, we study learning by relating account age (the length of time since an
account was opened) and summary statistics about past portfolio behavior and investment
performance to the future behavior and performance of each account.
We have four main results. First, investment performance improves with account age.
Second, older accounts have several protable tilts in their portfolio weights, particularly
towards value stocks and stocks with low turnover. However, these style tilts leave much
of the outperformance of older accounts unexplained. Third, two of the three potentially
harmful investment behaviors that we focus on, namely high turnover and the disposition
e¤ect, are less prevalent among older accounts. Fourth, all three investment behaviors
diminish in response to painful experiences, including account underperformance, large losses
in a single month, and poor returns from past trading and sales of gains. Putting these
results together, investors appear to learn from stock market participation, at a rate that is
inuenced by their investment experiences.
1.1 Related Literature
The behavior of individual investors in equity markets has been of interest to nancial
economists studying market e¢ ciency ever since the e¢ cient markets hypothesis was rst
formulated. Shleifer (2000) succinctly summarizes the importance of this line of inquiry
for the study of market e¢ ciency, outlining that theoretical defenses of the e¢ cient markets
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hypothesis rest on three pillars, the rst of which is rational decision making and securities
valuation by individuals, the second, the absence of correlated deviations from rational-
ity even if some investors deviate from rational decision making, and the third, limits to
arbitrage.
Understanding the behavior of individual investors is also important for the eld of house-
hold nance (see Campbell 2006, for example). There has been much work on theoretically
optimal investment in risky assets, and deviations from such idealized behavior by households
have important implications for the evolution of the wealth distribution in the economy.
While the theoretical motivation for the study of individual investors has been clear for
some time, empirical work in this area has been hampered by the di¢ culty of obtaining
detailed data on individual investorsportfolios as well as by the large computational bur-
den imposed by the study of such large datasets. These constraints have gradually been
surmounted, and this eld of study has increasingly become one of the most active areas of
empirical research in nancial economics.
Early work in the area (Cohn et al. 1975, Schlarbaum et al. 1978, Badrinath and
Lewellen 1991) utilized relatively small samples of trader accounts from retail or discount
brokerages to shed light on the stocks held by individual investors, the returns they earned,
and the practice of tax-loss selling. The rst set of empirical studies with a primary focus
on questions related to rationality and market e¢ ciency followed in the late 1990s, also
using data sourced from discount brokerages, identifying that individual investors exhibit
the disposition e¤ect (Odean 1998), and trade excessively in the sense that their transactions
costs outweigh any stock-picking ability they may possess (Odean 1999, Barber and Odean
2000). These tendencies were found to vary with the demographic characteristics and
trading technologies of investors such as gender, marital status, and access to online trading
(Barber and Odean 2001, 2002).
A characteristic of this early literature, and continuing to the present day, is the focus
on trading rather than investment decisions of individual investors. While many questions
in household nance are about the performance and risk properties of the entire risky asset
portfolio of individual households, much of the literature has concentrated on performance
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evaluation of individual investorspurchases and sales at di¤erent post-trade horizons (see,
for example, Coval et al. 2005, Barber et al. 2008, Seru et al. 2010), and on contrasting indi-
vidual returns with those achieved by domestic and foreign institutional investors (Grinblatt
and Keloharju 2000, Kaniel et al. 2008). A related focus has been on characterizing the
trading strategies of individual investors through the lens of various behavioral biases such
as the disposition e¤ect, overcondence, or inattention (see, for example, Barber and Odean
2008 and references above), and demonstrating the types of stocks (large, hard-to-value) in
which these biases are most likely to manifest themselves (Ranguelova 2001, Kumar 2009).
This focus on trades rather than on investment arises quite naturally from the limitations
of the data used to study investor behavior. In the US, discount brokerage accounts from a
single service provider may not be truly representative of the entire portfolio of an individual
investor, a problem made signicantly worse when investors also have untracked mutual
fund or 401(k) investments.2 And some international datasets, such as the Taiwanese stock
exchange data used by Barber et al. (2008), track all individual investor transactions but
have little detail on holdings.
Our use of Indian data on direct equity holdings and trades helps us to partially surmount
this obstacle. We have a relatively high-quality proxy for total household investment in risky
assets, because equity mutual fund ownership by individual investors in India is very much
smaller than direct equity ownership. As explained in the next section, we estimate that
Indian households equity mutual fund holdings are between 8% and 16% of their direct
equity holdings over our sample period.
There are some other countries, such as Sweden and Finland, in which both direct eq-
uity ownership and mutual fund holdings are tracked. In principle this allows for a fuller
characterization of household investment, but most previous studies using data from these
countries have pursued di¤erent objectives than our focus on learning to invest. For ex-
ample, Grinblatt et al. (2011) show that IQ a¤ects stock market participation using data
from the Finnish registry which provides detailed information on direct equity portfolios
2Calvet et al. (2007), show that mutual fund investments are an important source of diversication for
Swedish investors.
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combined with an indicator for whether the household invested in mutual funds in the year
2000. Grinblatt et al. (2012) highlight the impacts of IQ on mutual fund choice by Finnish
investors using detailed data on mutual fund choices alongside less detailed information on
direct equity investment. Calvet et. al (2007, 2009) use comprehensive data on Swedish
investorstotal wealth to shed light on stock-market participation and portfolio rebalancing,
but the annual frequency of their data makes it di¢ cult for them to evaluate higher-frequency
phenomena such as momentum investing and turnover
Several papers, including those referenced in the previous section, share our focus on
learning by individual investors, but emphasize di¤erent facets of this important issue. Feng
and Seasholes (2005) use data on over 1500 individual accounts from China over the 1999
to 2000 period, and nd that both experience (measured by the number of positions taken)
and sophistication (measured by variables that include the idiosyncratic variance share)
attenuate the disposition e¤ect. Our analysis di¤ers from theirs in our use of a more com-
prehensive set of portfolio characteristics, including the idiosyncratic variance share, and our
exploration of feedback e¤ects on future investing behavior. Linnainmaa (2010) estimates a
structural model of learning and trading by investors in Finland, focusing on high-frequency
traders, who make at least one round-trip trade in a given day. He nds, intriguingly, that
traders appear to experiment with high-frequency trading to better understand their levels
of skill, and cease trading if they experience poor returns. Our estimated feedback e¤ects on
underdiversication suggest that households also experiment with the composition of their
equity portfolios, choosing to underdiversify more aggressively if they beat the market. This
nding of experimentation is also consistent with Seru et. al. (2010), who carefully study
the trading behavior of Finnish investors, focusing on the disposition e¤ect. Seru et al. nd
that investors stop trading (exit) after inferring that their ability is poor, and that trading
experience weakens the disposition e¤ect.3 Our work is distinguished from this literature
by our focus on investments rather than trades; to provide an instructive example, exitin
3Related work on the positive e¤ect of trader experimentation and trader experience on returns and
bias attenuation includes Dhar and Zhu (2006), Mahani and Bernhardt (2007), and Nicolosi et al. (2009).
Korniotis and Kumar (2011), in contrast, nd that the adverse e¤ects of aging dominate the positive e¤ects
of experience.
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our setting is the relatively uncommon exit of an investor from all equity positions, whereas
Seru et al. use this term to refer to a period of time during which no trading occurs.4
Other authors have demonstrated the impacts of learning, including reinforcement learn-
ing, in other settings, such as trend following by mutual fund managers during the technology
boom (Greenwood and Nagel 2009), individual investment in IPOs (Kaustia and Knüpfer
2008, Chiang et al. 2011) and household choice of credit cards (Agarwal et al., 2006, 2008).
Agarwal et al. (2008) nd that households learn how best to reduce fees on their credit card
bills, and estimate that knowledge depreciates by roughly 10% per month, i.e., they nd
evidence that households learn and subsequently forget. While our current specications do
not explore this possibility, this is an important avenue that we intend to pursue in future
work.
Finally, while we explore the role of personal feedback and investment experience in
households learning about investment, we do not currently consider the important topic
of how social interaction or local networks a¤ect learning (Hong et al., 2004, Ivkovic and
Weisbenner, 2005, 2007).
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our data,
denes the empirical proxies we use for investment mistakes and style tilts, and presents some
summary statistics. Section 3 relates account age to investment performance and behaviors.
Section 4 shows that past performance predicts account behavior, while Section 5 shows that
the behavior of the investor base predicts the returns on Indian stocks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Summary Statistics
2.1 Electronic stock ownership records
Our data come from Indias National Securities Depository Limited (NSDL), with the ap-
proval of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the apex capital markets
4While the frequency of exits is relatively low in our data, we estimate two alternative specications to
account for any potential biases caused by exits that are driven either by skill or luck.
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regulator in India. NSDL was established in 1996 to promote dematerialization, that is,
the transition of equity ownership from physical stock certicates to electronic records of
ownership. It is the older of the two depositories in India, and has a signicantly larger
market share (in terms of total assets tracked, roughly 80%, and in terms of the number
of accounts, roughly 60%) than the other depository, namely, Central Depository Services
Limited (CDSL).
While equity securities in India can be held in both dematerialized and physical form,
settlement of all market trades in listed securities in dematerialized form is compulsory.
To facilitate the transition from the physical holding of securities, the stock exchanges do
provide an additional trading window, which gives a one time facility for small investors to
sell up to 500 physical shares; however the buyer of these shares has to dematerialize such
shares before selling them again, thus ensuring their eventual dematerialization. Statistics
from the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE) highlight
that virtually all stock transactions take place in dematerialized form.
The sensitive nature of these data mean that there are certain limitations on the demo-
graphic information provided to us. While we are able to identify monthly stock holdings and
transactions records at the account level in all equity securities on the Indian markets, we
have sparse demographic information on the account holders. The information we do have
includes the state in which the investor is located, whether the investor is located in an ur-
ban, rural, or semi-urban part of the state, and the type of investor. We use investor type to
classify accounts as benecial owners, domestic nancial institutions, domestic non-nancial
institutions, foreign institutions, foreign nationals, government, and individual accounts.5
This paper studies only the last category of individual accounts.
A single investor can hold multiple accounts on NSDL; however, a requirement for ac-
count opening is that the investor provides a Permanent Account Number (PAN) with each
5We classify any account which holds greater than 5% of an stock with market capitalization above 500
million Rs (approximately $10 million) as a benecial owner account if that account is a trust or body
corporate account, or would otherwise be classied as an individual account. This separates accounts
with signicant control rights from standard investment accounts. Otherwise our account classications are
many-to-one mappings based on the detailed investor types we observe.
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account. The PAN is a unique identier issued to all taxpayers by the Income Tax Depart-
ment of India. NSDL provided us with a mapping from PANs to accounts, so in our empirical
work, we aggregate all individual accounts associated with a single PAN. PAN aggregation
reduces the total number of individual accounts in our database from about 13.7 million to
11.6 million. It is worth noting here that PAN aggregation may not always correspond to
household aggregation if a household has several PAN numbers, for example, if children or
spouses have separate PANs.
Table 1 summarizes the coverage of the NSDL dataset. The rst two columns report the
total number of securities (unique International Securities Identication Numbers or ISIN)
and the total number of Indian equities reported in each year. Securities coverage grows
considerably over time from just over 12,200 in 2004 to almost 23,000 in 2012, as does the
number of unique Indian equities covered. Starting at 4,510 in 2004, the number of equities
reaches a peak of 7,721 in 2012. When we match these data to price, returns, and corporate
nance information from various datasets, we are able to match between 95% and 98% of
the market capitalization of these equities, and roughly the same fraction of the individual
investor ownership share each year.
The third column shows the market capitalization of the BSE at the end of each year.
The dramatic variation in the series reects both an Indian boom in the mid-2000s, and the
impact of the global nancial crisis in 2008.
The fourth column of Table 1 shows the fraction of Indian equity market capitalization
that is held in NSDL accounts. The NSDL share grows from about 50% at the beginning
of our sample period to about 70% at the end. The fth column reports the fraction of
NSDL market capitalization that is held in individual accounts. The individual share starts
at about 18% in 2004, but declines to just below 10% in 2012, reecting changes in NSDL
coverage of institutions, as well as an increase in institutional investment over our sample
period.
The sixth column shows the mutual fund share of total equities, which accounts for a
little over 3.5% of total assets in the NSDL data in 2004, growing to a maximum of 4.72%
in 2006, and declining to 3.97% by 2012. While comparing the fth and sixth columns of
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Table 1 demonstrates the magnitude of direct household equity ownership relative to mutual
funds, this simple comparison would lead to an overestimate of mutual fund ownership by
households. SEBI data in 2010 show that roughly 60% of mutual funds in India are held
by corporations.6 Assuming that this share has been static over our sample period, and
that corporations and individuals hold roughly the same fraction of equity and bond mutual
funds, this leads us to estimate that mutual fund holdings were between 8% and 16% of
household direct equity holdings over the sample period. We note also that a 2009 SEBI
survey of Indian equity-owning households found that about 65% of such households did
not own any bonds or mutual funds.
Figure 1 illustrates the expansion of equity ownership in India by plotting the number
of individual accounts active at each point in time. From the beginning to the end of our
sample period, this number grew from 2.7 million to roughly 6.1 million, that is, by 125%.
Equity ownership expanded throughout the decade, but the rate of growth is correlated with
the return on the aggregate Indian market (illustrated by the dashed line in the gure).
Growth was particularly rapid in 2004 and 2007, and much slower in the period since the
onset of the global nancial crisis.
2.2 Characteristics of individual accounts
Table 2 describes some basic characteristics of the individual accounts in our dataset. Be-
cause this dataset is an unbalanced panel, with accounts entering and exiting over time, we
summarize it in two ways. The rst set of three columns reports time-series moments of
cross-sectional means. The rst column is the time-series mean of the cross-sectional means,
which gives equal weight to each month regardless of the number of accounts active in that
month. The second and third columns are the time-series maximum and minimum of the
cross-sectional mean, showing the extreme extent of time-variation in cross-sectional average
account behavior.
The second set of three columns reports cross-sectional moments of time-series means
6See SEBI website, http://www.sebi.gov.in/mf/unithold.html.
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calculated for each account over its active life, giving equal weight to each account which
is active for at least twelve months. Since the cross-sectional dimension of the dataset is
much larger than the time-series dimension, we report the 10th percentile, median, and 90th
percentile of the cross-sectional distribution.
For this table and all subsequent analysis, the data used represents a stratied random
sample of our full dataset, an approach we also use (and describe more fully) in the regression
analysis of the next section.
Account size, number of stocks held, and location
In the rst panel of Table 2, we begin by reporting account sizes both in rupees (using
Indian conventions for comma placement), and in US dollars, both corrected for ination to
a January 2012 basis. The cross-sectional average account size varies across months from
under $4,000 in 2004 to about $68,000 in June 2008, with a time-series mean of $24,760.
The median account size is however much smaller at $1,330, and even the 90th percentile
account size is only $10,494, reecting positive skewness in the distribution of account sizes.
This positive skewness also explains the time-series variability of cross-sectional average
account size, which is strongly inuenced by the entry and exit of very large accounts. The
large di¤erence between mean and median account sizes implies that the weighting scheme
used in summary statistics and regressions will have an important inuence on the results.
Given our focus on household nance questions, as opposed to the determination of Indian
asset prices, we equally weight accounts in most of our empirical analysis as advocated by
Campbell (2006).
The number of stocks held in each account is also positively skewed. The average number
of stocks held across all accounts and time periods is almost 7, but the median account holds
only 3.4 stocks on average over its life. The 10th percentile account holds 1 stock, while the
90th percentile account holds 14.2 stocks.
The next row shows that around 56% of individual accounts are associated with urban
account addresses, 32% with rural addresses, and 12% with semi-urban addresses. These
relative shares do change somewhat over time.7
7See the Data Appendix for a description of the method used to classify accounts into location-based
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Account performance
The second panel of Table 2 looks at monthly account returns, calculated from beginning-
of-month stock positions and monthly returns on Indian stocks.8 These returns are those
that an account will experience if it does not trade during a given month; in the language
of Calvet et al. (2009a), it is a passive return. It captures the properties of stocks held,
but will not be a perfectly accurate measure of return for an account that trades within a
month.
The table shows that on average, individual accounts have slightly underperformed the
Indian market (proxied by a value-weighted index that we have calculated ourselves). There
is considerable variation over time in the cross-sectional average, with individual accounts
underperforming in their worst months by as much as 7.8% or overperforming in their best
months by as much as 9.7%. This variation is consistent with the literature on institutional
and individual performance in US data (e.g. Grinblatt and Titman 1993, Kovtunenko and
Sosner 2004, Kaniel et al. 2008), and can be explained in part by style preferences of
individual investors. There is also dramatic variation across investors in their time-series
average performance, with the 10th percentile account underperforming by 1.89% per month
and the 90th percentile account overperforming by 1.56% per month.
Underdiversication
The next set of three rows examines account-level statistics that proxy for the investment
mistakes described in the introduction. The idiosyncratic share of portfolio variance is
calculated from estimates of each stocks beta and idiosyncratic risk, using a market model
with the value-weighted universe of Indian stocks as the market portfolio, using a procedure
very similar to that employed in Calvet et al. (2007). In order to reduce noise in estimated
stock-level betas, however, we do not use past stock-level betas but instead use tted values
from a panel regression whose explanatory variables include stock-level realized betas (in
monthly data over the past two years), the realized betas of stocks in the same size, value,
and momentum quintiles, industry dummies, and a dummy for stocks that are less than two
categories.
8The Data Appendix provides details on our procedures for calculating Indian stock returns.
12
years from their initial listing. To reduce noise in estimated idiosyncratic risk, we estimate
idiosyncratic variance from a GARCH(1,1) model.9
The average idiosyncratic share is 45% in both the time-series and cross-sectional mo-
ments, which is slightly lower than the median idiosyncratic share of 55% reported by Calvet
et al. (2007), the di¤erence probably resulting from our use of an Indian rather than a global
market index. Once again there is considerable variation over time (from 23% to 54%) and
across accounts (from 23% at the 10th percentile to 67% at the 90th percentile). However,
the idiosyncratic variance share is not skewed to the same degree as the number of stocks
held (reported in the top panel of the table), reecting the convex declining relation between
the number of stocks held in a portfolio and the portfolios idiosyncratic risk.
Turnover
Turnover is estimated by averaging sales turnover (the fraction of the value of last months
holdings, at last months prices, that was sold in the current month) and purchase turnover
(the fraction of the value of this months holdings, using this months prices, that was
purchased in the current month). This measure of turnover is not particularly high on
average for Indian individual accounts. The time-series mean of the cross-sectional mean
is 5.6% per month (or about 67% per year), and the cross-sectional median turnover is only
2.3% (or 28% per year). Turnover this low should not create large di¤erences between the
passive return we calculate for accounts and the true return that takes account of intra-month
trading.
Once again, however, there is important variation over time and particularly across ac-
counts. The 10th percentile account has no turnover at all (holding the same stocks through-
out its active life), while the 90th percentile account has a turnover of 15.8% per month (190%
per year).
Following Odean (1999), we have compared the returns on stocks sold by individual
Indian investors to the returns on stocks bought by the same group of investors over the
9The GARCH model is rst estimated for each stock, then is re-estimated with the GARCH coe¢ cients
constrained to equal the median such coe¢ cient estimated across stocks. This approach deals with stocks
for which the GARCH model does not converge or yields unstable out of sample estimates.
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four months following the purchase or sale. In India, the former exceeds the latter by
2.78%, which makes it more di¢ cult to argue that trading by individuals is not economically
harmful. By comparison, the di¤erence Odean nds in US discount brokerage data is a much
smaller 1.36%. At a one year horizon following the purchase or sale, we nd that stocks sold
outperform stocks bought by 5.25% compared to 3.31% in Odeans data.
The disposition e¤ect
We calculate the disposition e¤ect using the log ratio of the proportion of gains realized
(PGR) to the proportion of losses realized (PLR). This is a modication of the previous
literature which often looks at the simple di¤erence between PGR and PLR. PGR and PLR
are measured within each month where the account executes a sale as follows: Gains and
losses on each stock are determined relative to the cost basis of the position if the position was
established after account registry with NSDL (i.e. if the cost basis is known). Otherwise, we
use the median month-end price over the 12 months prior to NSDL registry as the reference
point for determining gains and losses (we do this in roughly 30% of cases). Sales are
counted only if a position is fully sold, although this convention makes little di¤erence to
the properties of the measure. When computing the measure, we winsorize PGR and PLR
below at 0.01.
The disposition e¤ect is important for Indian individual accounts. On average across
months, the cross-sectional mean proportion of gains realized is 1.24 log points or 245% larger
than the proportion of losses realized, while the median account has a PGR that is 1.37 log
points or 293% larger than its PLR. While both time-series and cross-sectional variation
in the disposition e¤ect are substantial, it is worth noting that over 90% of accounts in the
sample with 12 or more months with sales exhibit this e¤ect.
Figure 2 compares the disposition e¤ect in our Indian data with US results reported by
Odean (1998). The gure plots the log mean ratio of PGR to PLR by calendar month, a
series that can be compared with Odeans numbers. The Indian disposition e¤ect is con-
siderably stronger on average than the US e¤ect. In both India and the US, the disposition
e¤ect is weaker towards the end of the tax year (calendar Q4 in the US, and calendar Q1 in
India).
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Style tilts
Table 2 also reports several measures of individual accountsstyle tilts. We construct
account-level betas with the Indian market by estimating stock-level betas as described
earlier, and then value-weighting them within each account. The average beta is very
slightly greater than one at 1.02 in both the time-series and cross-sectional moments. The
cross-sectional mean betas have modest variation over time from 0.94 to 1.08, and the cross-
sectional variation in the time-series average beta is also small.
In US data, individual investors overweight small stocks, which of course implies that
institutional investors overweight large stocks (Falkenstein 1996, Gompers and Metrick 2001,
Kovtunenko and Sosner 2004). We measure this tendency in our Indian dataset by calculat-
ing the value-weighted average market-capitalization percentile of stocks held in individual
accounts, relative to the value-weighted average market-capitalization percentile of stocks
in the market index. We nd a modest individual-investor tilt towards small stocks: the
time-series mean percentile of market cap held by individual investors is 4.6% lower than the
market index. This tilt varies modestly over time, but never switches sign. The small-cap
tilt is skewed across accounts: the 10th percentile account has an 18% small-cap tilt while
the 90th percentile account has a 3% large-cap tilt.
Individual Indian investors have a very small tilt on average towards value stocks. Rank-
ing stocks by their book-market ratio and calculating percentiles in the same manner that
we did for market capitalization, we nd that the time-series mean percentile of value held
by individual investors is only 3.2% greater than the market index. This value tilt varies
over time and does switch sign, reaching almost -6% in the month that is most tilted to-
wards growth. There are also very large di¤erences across accounts in their orientation
towards growth or value, with a spread of over 30% between the 10th and 90th percentiles
of accounts.
Finally, individual investors have a strong contrarian, or anti-momentum tilt. Ranking
stocks by momentum and calculating the momentum tilt using our standard methodology,
we nd that both the time-series mean and cross-sectional median momentum tilts are about
-5%. This pattern is consistent with results reported for US data by Cohen et al. (2002),
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and with short-term e¤ects (but not longer-term e¤ects) of past returns on institutional
equity purchases estimated by Campbell et al. (2009).
Cross-sectional correlations of characteristics
Table 3 asks how the account characteristics described in Table 2 are correlated across
accounts. We calculate cross-sectional correlations of account characteristics for each month,
and then report the time-series mean of these correlations. To limit the inuence of out-
liers, we winsorize account-level stock returns at the 1st and 99th percentiles, and winsorize
account value below at 10,000 rupees (approximately $200).
There are a number of intriguing patterns in Table 3. Older accounts tend to be larger,
and account age is negatively correlated with all three of our investment behavior proxies
an e¤ect we explore in detail in the next section. Among the proxies, turnover also has
a 0.34 correlation with the idiosyncratic share of variance, implying that underdiversied
accounts tend to trade more. All the investment behavior proxies are positively correlated
with accountsmarket betas and negatively correlated with their size tilts, implying that
accounts holding high-beta and small-cap stocks tend to be less diversied, trade more,
and have a stronger disposition e¤ect. The log of account value correlates negatively with
beta and value, and positively with size and momentum tilts. This implies that larger
individual accounts look more like institutional accounts in that they prefer lower-beta stocks,
growth stocks, large stocks, and recent strong performers. Finally, there is a strong negative
correlation of -0.46 between the size tilt and the value tilt, implying that individuals who
hold value stocks also tend to hold small stocks. This e¤ect is somewhat mechanical given
the correlation of these characteristics in the Indian universe.
3 Account Age E¤ects on Performance and Behavior
3.1 Regression specications
In this section we explore the relation between the age of an account our measure of overall
investor experience and sophistication and the accounts performance and behavioral bi-
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ases. In order to do this, we work with two alternative regression specications. Dening an
outcome (account return or behavior) for investor i at time t as Yit, and the cross-sectional
average of Yit at time t as Yt, we rst estimate
Yit   Yt = (Ait   At) + si + "it; (1)
where Ait is a measure of the age of account i at time t, At is the cross-sectional average
age measure for all accounts at time t, and si is an investor xed e¤ect that captures the
inherent sophistication of investor i. We include the investor xed e¤ect to address the
concern that more sophisticated investors may enter the market earlier and exit the market
later than unsophisticated investors, which would make older accounts disproportionately
sophisticated and would bias the estimation of a pure age e¤ect. Equation (1) is our baseline
specication.
A potential weakness in this approach is that the disposition e¤ect  the tendency of
investors to sell gains rather than losses could lead to the disproportionate exit of investors
who have earned high returns, presumably largely due to luck (Calvet et al. 2009a). As
a consequence, older accounts may disproportionately be held by investors who had poor
returns when their accounts were newer. In the presence of investor xed e¤ects, this biases
upwards the estimated e¤ect of account age on portfolio returns. To deal with this potential
source of bias, we also estimate an alternative specication:
Yi;t = t + Ait + Ci + "it; (2)
where t represents an unobserved time xed e¤ect. The vector Ci contains measured
attributes of investor i which proxy for sophistication. The Ci include initial account value,
initial number of stocks held, investor location type (urban or rural), and the income and
literacy levels of the Indian state in which the investor resides at the time that the account
was opened. In addition we include cohort-level means of these characteristics to capture
the idea that accounts opened at a time when most other accounts are sophisticated are
more likely to be sophisticated themselves.
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In specication (2), account exits driven by lucky returns have no e¤ect on the estimated
age e¤ect, but early entry and late exit by sophisticated, skilled investors does bias upward
the age e¤ect to the extent that the variables in Ci do not fully capture investor sophistica-
tion. For these reasons, we estimate both specications to check the robustness of our results
to these two potential sources of bias. As we continue this research we plan to estimate an
auxiliary model of exit in order to estimate the possible size of exit-related bias.
Other explanatory variables can be added to these regressions. One natural choice is
account size, which we know from Table 3 is correlated with both account age and investment
behaviors. We note however that account size is mechanically correlated with past returns.
In the presence of an investor xed e¤ect, as in specication (1), this can lead to a spurious
negative e¤ect of size on returns along with a spuriously positive xed e¤ect for accounts
that experience high early returns. Accordingly we exclude account size from our regressions
predicting returns, although we have conrmed that the inclusion of size in specication
(2) has little impact on the reported results. Investment behaviors can also be added as
regressors in both specications (1) and (2).
In both regression specications we consider several possible forms for the account age
e¤ect. First and most simply, we consider linear age e¤ects: Ait = Ageit. Since there is no
particular reason why an investors expected returns or behavior should be a linear function
of account age, we also model account age e¤ects as a piecewise linear form of account age.
The curvature of the piecewise linear age e¤ects suggests age e¤ects of the form Ait = Age0:5it ;
which we adopt as our benchmark for the non-linear functional form of account age e¤ects.
These regressions are estimated on a stratied random sample, drawing 5,000 individual
accounts from each Indian state with more than 5,000 accounts, and all accounts from states
with fewer than 5,000 accounts. Figure 3 shows the distribution of NSDL accounts from
various states. The size of the bubbles in the plot are proportional to the population of each
state. The Y-axis shows the number of people in each state per NSDL account, and the
X-axis plots the per-capita income of the state in 2011. For example, in Bihar, a poor state
with a per-capita annual income of roughly $350 per annum, 1 in 1400 people invest in the
stock market and are captured in NSDL data, whereas the small, relatively wealthy state of
18
Delhi, with per-capita annual income of roughly $2600, has 1 in 33 people participating and
captured in NSDL. Given that the NSDL share of total equity capitalization is around 70%
in 2012, these fractions are relatively accurate representations of total participation (without
accounting for pure indirect equity ownership) by individual households in the stock market.
Our return regressions are estimated using 4 million account months of data spanning
January 2004 through January 2012, and our regressions of account behaviors use somewhat
fewer observations, as these measures cannot be dened for as many account months. We
estimate panel regressions applying equal weight to each cross-section, and within each cross-
section, we use weights to account for the sampling strategy. Standard errors are computed
by bootstrapping months of data, to account for any possible contemporaneous correlation
of the residuals.
3.2 How performance improves with age
Table 4 reports four variants of our basic regression approach and documents the relationship
of our behavior measures to returns at the account level. The rst three columns predict
account returns relative to the cross-sectional average of all account returns (specication
1), while the next three columns (specication 2) allow for a time e¤ect. The e¤ect of age
is estimated either to be linear (columns [a] and [c]) or square-root (columns [b]), where
the coe¢ cients reported give the expected performance of a one-year-old account relative to
a brand new account. The linear age e¤ect is estimated to be about 14 basis points per
month in specication 1, and 11 basis points per month in specication 2, and both e¤ects
are statistically signicant at the 5% level. The square-root age e¤ect is greater for a
one-year-old account (39 basis points in specication 1 and 30 basis points in specication
2), but of course it dies o¤more rapidly and the coe¢ cient is only statistically signicant at
the 10% level for specication 2.
Columns [c] of Table 4 show that the age e¤ect in returns barely changes once we control
for lagged investor behaviors. The superior performance of older accounts cannot be purely
attributed to any propensity of older accounts to better diversify, trade less, or show less
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disposition bias.
Figure 4 illustrates the choice between a linear and a square-root functional form, with
results for account returns shown in the top left panel of the gure. The solid line shows
the estimates from a more general piecewise linear function of age, while the dashed lines
illustrate three parametric models, linear, square-root, and cube-root. The piecewise linear
function is upward-sloping but somewhat jagged, and evidence for concavity is quite weak.
An important question is how more experienced investors achieve higher average returns.
In Table 5 we attempt to answer this question by forming a zero-cost portfolio that goes long
stocks held by a representative experienced investor (a stratied-sample-weighted average of
the portfolio weights of accounts in the oldest quintile), and goes short stocks held by a
representative novice investor (a stratied-sample-weighted average of the portfolio weights
of accounts in the youngest quintile). Figure 5 illustrates the cumulative excess returns
to the long and short legs of this portfolio relative to the Indian short rate, along with the
overall excess return of the Indian equity market, over the period January 2004-January
2012. By the end of this period the cumulative excess return on the experienced-investor
portfolio was 122%, while the cumulative excess return on the Indian market index was 87%,
and the cumulative excess return on the novice-investor portfolio was only 29%.
In the rst column of Table 5, we regress the portfolio weights in the zero-cost portfolio
onto a vector of stock characteristics, to see what characteristics are preferred or avoided by
experienced investors relative to novice investors. In the second column, we decompose the
returns on the zero-cost portfolio into unconditional and timing e¤ects related to either stock
characteristic tilts or a residual that we call selectivityfollowing Wermers (2000). The top
half of this column reports the unconditional contribution of each stock characteristic tilt
to returns, reporting standard errors that take into account the sampling error in returns to
characteristics as well as uncertainty in the characteristic tilt itself. The lower part of this
column reports the overall performance contribution of all unconditional characteristic tilts,
together with the contributions of unconditional stock selectivity, and stock characteristic
and other stock timing e¤ects. The third and fourth columns of the table repeat this exercise
adding a variable for large, attention-grabbing initial public o¤erings, to capture the idea
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that such events might be important contributors to the performance of novice investors.
Table 5 shows that relative to novice investors, experienced Indian investors tilt their
portfolios towards low-beta stocks; this has a minimal e¤ect on return while reducing risk.
Experienced investors also have little systematic preference for momentum. However, they
do have a number of other important characteristic tilts. They favor small stocks, value
stocks, stocks with low turnover, stocks without large benecial ownership, stocks held by
institutions, and older stocks. All of these tilts except for the size tilt, which contributes
negligibly, are return-enhancing. In particular, more experienced investors enjoy higher
returns from their tilts towards value stocks and low turnover stocks.
Taken together, the stock characteristics explain 22 basis points per month out of a total
excess return of 39 basis points. The remainder is not explained by characteristic timing,
which makes an insignicant negative contribution of -2 basis points. The remaining 19
basis points of performance are split between non-characteristic related stock selection (7
basis points) and stock timing e¤ects (12 basis points). Results are generally similar when
we add in a dummy for large IPOs, though the apparent preference of older accounts for
older stocks appears to be entirely due to their avoidance of large IPOs.
The characteristic tilts documented in Table 5 suggest that performance evaluation of
experienced investors relative to novice investors may need to correct for exposures to sys-
tematic risk factors. Table 6 compares raw excess returns to CAPM and multi-factor alphas
for the long-short portfolio constructed in Table 5. The rst column of the table reports
a raw excess return of 39 basis points per month, which is statistically signicant only at
the 10% level because of noise created by market movements. The second column shows
that this corresponds to a CAPM alpha of 54 basis points per month signicant at the
5% level and a negative market beta of -0.15, reecting the fact that older accounts tend
to hold somewhat lower-beta stocks even while delivering a higher return. The third and
fourth columns show that the alpha increases to 64 basis points per month in a Fama-
French-Carhart four-factor model including momentum, and 93 basis points per month in a
six-factor model that includes factors for short-term reversals and illiquidity (proxied by a
long-short portfolio constructed by sorting the universe of stocks on turnover). Interestingly,
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the long-short portfolio has negative loadings on an Indian version of the Fama-French HML
factor and our illiquidity factor, despite the preference of experienced investors for stocks
with high book-market ratios and lower turnover documented in Table 5.
3.3 How behavior changes with age
We now ask whether our three proxies for investment behaviors change with the age of the
account. Table 7 predicts the idiosyncratic variance share, turnover, and disposition bias
measured by the log ratio of PGR to PLR, again using our two specications (1) and (2)
and allowing for either a linear or square-root age e¤ect. While a positive linear age e¤ect
t performance better, turnover is better captured by a negative square-root function of age.
This is shown by the incremental R2 statistics reported in the table, which measure the
contribution of the age variable to the overall t of the regression, and are markedly higher
for the square-root specication. The piecewise linear regressions shown in the lower left
panel of Figure 4 is also clearly declining and convex.
The age e¤ects documented in Table 4 are not only statistically signicant, but large in
economic magnitude. To see this, the vertical axes on the plots in Figure 4 are scaled to have
a range equal to twice the cross-sectional standard deviation in returns or behavior. Over
the course of ve years, monthly turnover declines by 11 percentage points and disposition
bias declines by 56 log percentage points, both of which are on par with or greater than
the cross-sectional standard deviation. In contrast, the portfolio share of idiosyncratic
variance changes little with age. This may not be surprising when considering the results
of Ivkovic et al. (2008), who suggest that underdiversication may also represent extreme
sophistication  they nd that individual trader performance improves as the number of
stock holdings decrease, holding other determinants of performance constant. In addition,
Table 5 showed that experienced Indian investors have a preference for small value stocks,
which have unusually high idiosyncratic volatility.
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4 Investment Experience and Behavior
Since behavior changes dramatically with account age, it is plausible that it may also be
a¤ected not only by the fact of investing, but also by the experiences that investors have in
the market. We explore this possibility in Table 8, which uses xed-e¤ect regressions (1) to
predict our three proxies for investment mistakes. All regressions include square-root age
e¤ects and account size controls as in the previous section.
Panel A of Table 8 predicts the idiosyncratic share of portfolio variance. The predictor
variables are two summaries of past investment success: the cumulative outperformance of
the account relative to the market, and the worst monthly return experienced by each ac-
count. Cumulative account outperformance may lead investors to assess their investing skills
more optimistically, encouraging them to make larger idiosyncratic bets. Large negative
returns may remind investors of the risks of stock market investing in general, and undiver-
sied investing in particular. Both variables enter strongly, with positive and negative signs
respectively. However, this result must be interpreted with some caution because the e¤ect
of cumulative outperformance may result in part from inertia. If an account has a diversied
component and an undiversied bet, the weight of the undiversied bet increases with its
return if the account is not rebalanced, and this will mechanically increase the idiosyncratic
share of variance.
In panel B of Table 8 we predict turnover from the cumulative increase in returns due
to trades, a measure of an accounts past trading success. For each month, the return to
trades is calculated as the di¤erence between actual returns in the current month and the
returns that would have been experienced if the account had stopped trading three months
earlier. This return to trades is then cumulated over the life of the account. This variable
strongly predicts turnover, implying that trading prots strengthen the tendency to trade
stocks frequently. This result is consistent with the ndings of Linnainmaa (2011), who
employs information on a set of high-frequency traders from Finland. The two variables
from panel A also enter the turnover regression signicantly.
It should be noted that the e¤ect of recent trading prots on turnover may result in part
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from the disposition e¤ect. If recent trading is protable, then an account has tended to
purchase winners which are more likely to be sold if the investor has disposition bias. Such
sales, and subsequent purchases of replacement stocks, increase turnover.
Finally, in panel C we predict disposition bias using the returns to past sales of winners
and losers. We calculate excess returns relative to the market index on stocks that each
account sold, during the three month period following each sale, and compare the excess
returns to losers sold relative to winners sold, weighting by the value of each sale and nally
cumulating this measure over the life of the account. The idea of this measure is that if an
account holds mean-reverting stocks, disposition bias tends to be protable because winners
sold underperform losers sold after the sale date, encouraging further disposition bias. If an
account holds stocks that display short-term momentum, however, disposition bias tends to
be unprotable and may be discouraged by experience. This variable enters the regression
with the expected sign, but is not statistically signicant.
Figure 6 illustrates the relative importance of account age and investment experience
in predicting each of our three investment behaviors. For all accounts that opened in
December 2003, the gure shows the predicted behaviors from January 2004 through the end
of the sample, using the all predictor variables except account value from the specication in
column [2] of Table 8. The gure illustrates the median and the 10th and 90th percentiles
of predicted behaviors. In both the disposition e¤ect and turnover plots, the dominant
inuence of the age e¤ect is clearly visible in the gure, but the spread in predicted behaviors
across accounts is meaningful in the case of all investment behavior proxies. Declines in
predicted behaviors occur rapidly at the beginning of the period, because of a strong early
age e¤ect and a market downturn in the spring of 2004. There is also a marked decline in
the fall of 2008, again resulting from poor stock returns.
The empirical results of this section provide suggestive evidence of reinforcement learning
among Indian equity investors. Our interpretation might be challenged if there is reverse
causality, for example if skilled traders generate trading prots and continue to trade fre-
quently in the future, or if certain investors specialize in holding mean-reverting stocks for
which realizing gains and holding losses is a systematically protable strategy. The presence
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of account level xed e¤ects in our specications should signicantly reduce concerns on this
score, as the investors average skill at trading should be absorbed by these account level
e¤ects. In addition, our regressions in Table 4 showed that turnover and disposition bias are
associated with lower account returns, not higher returns as reverse causality would require.
5 Stock Returns and the Investor Base
In this section we change our focus from the performance of individual accounts to the
performance of the stocks they hold, as predicted by the investor base of those stocks. This
is somewhat analogous to the recent literature on the performance of mutual fundsstock
picks, as opposed to the overall performance of the funds themselves (Wermers 2000, Cohen
et al. 2010).
Table 9 uses Fama-MacBeth regressions to predict the returns of Indian stocks with at
least 10 individual investors in our sample of individual accounts. Column 1 shows that the
average age of the accounts that hold a stock predicts the return to that stock, consistent
with the account-level results reported in Table 4. Column 2 adds information on the
behavior of the investor base: the average share of idiosyncratic variance in the portfolios of
the stocks investors, the turnover of these portfolios, and the disposition bias of the stocks
investors. A high turnover investor base in particular predicts lower returns. The age e¤ect,
though somewhat diminished, remains signicant.
Column 3 adds a standard set of stock characteristics to the regression. The book-market
ratio and momentum enter positively, and stock turnover enters negatively, consistent with
evidence from developed markets. The e¤ect of account age in the investor base is now
much weaker, but stocks with undiversied investors have lower average returns (signicant
at the 5% level), and stocks with disposition-biased investors have lower average returns.
The e¤ect of a high-turnover investor base remains negative, but it is smaller in magnitude
because it is correlated with turnover in the stock itself.
The institutional ownership of stocks is included in Table 9 to addresses one possible
concern about our nding of a positive age e¤ect. Since institutional investors have gained
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market share over our sample period, stocks favored by such investors may rise in price just
because they control more capital over time (Gompers and Metrick 2001). If older individual
accounts are more like institutions, and hold similar stocks, this transitional e¤ect may
benet long-established individual investors as well as institutions. However, this story is
contradicted by the fact that in Table 9, the coe¢ cient on institutional ownership is negative
rather than positive.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the investment strategies and performance of individual in-
vestors in Indian equities over the period from 2004 to 2012. We nd strong e¤ects of
account age, the number of years since a particular account begins holding Indian stocks
and appears in our dataset. Older accounts outperform younger ones, in part by tilting
protably towards value stocks and stocks of longer-established companies, but also by pick-
ing stocks that perform well after controlling for their characteristics. Older accounts also
have lower turnover and a smaller disposition e¤ect.
Our evidence also suggests that learning is important among Indian individual investors.
Accounts that have experienced low returns relative to the market, and low returns in a
single month, increase their diversication and reduce their turnover and disposition bias.
Moreover, accounts that have experienced low returns from their trading decisions tend to
reduce their turnover in the future, while poor returns associated with the disposition e¤ect
have an imprecisely estimated negative e¤ect on future disposition bias. These results
suggest that Indian individual investors learn, not only from the experience of stock market
participation itself, but also from the returns generated by their investment behaviors.
If investment behaviors are related to investor nancial sophistication, and if sophisti-
cated investors are able to pick stocks with high expected returns, then the characteristics
of a stocks investor base can be used to predict the stocks returns. We present evidence
that this is the case, even controlling for the stocks own characteristics.
There are several interesting questions we have not yet explored, but plan to examine in
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the next version of this paper. We can ask whether the e¤ect of experience on behavior
is permanent, as implicitly assumed by our specication that predicts behavior using cu-
mulative past returns, or whether the e¤ect of experience decays over time as suggested by
Agarwal et al. (2006, 2008). Second, we can explore whether the e¤ect of experience on
behavior varies with age, as might be the case if investors update priors about their skill or
about the merits of selling winning positions, and gradually become more condent in their
beliefs. Finally, we can ask whether all three of the behaviors studied in this paper can
be aggregated into a single index of nancial sophistication, as suggested by Calvet et al.
(2009b).
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Data Appendix
Classication of Investor Account Geography (Urban/Rural/Semi-Urban)
We provided NSDL with a mapping of PIN codes (Indian equivalent of ZIP codes) to
an indicator of whether the PIN is a rural, urban, or semi-urban geography. To make this
determination, PIN codes were matched to state and district in an urbanization classication
scheme provided by Indicus. In cases where urbanization at the district level is ambiguous,
we use use postal data, noting that the distribution of number of large postal branches and
small sub-branches in a PIN is markedly di¤erent in urban and rural geographies.
Stock Data
We collect stock-level data on monthly total returns, market capitalization, and book
value from three sources: Compustat Global, Datastream, and Prowess. Prowess further
reports data sourced from both of Indias major stock exchanges, the BSE and NSE. In
addition, price returns can be inferred from the month-end holding values and quantities in
the NSDL database. We link the datasets by ISIN.10
To verify reliability of total returns, we compare total returns from the (up to three) data
sources, computing the absolute di¤erences in returns series across sources. For each stock-
month, we use returns from one of the datasets for which the absolute di¤erence in returns
with another dataset is smallest, where the exact source is selected in the following order of
priority: Compustat Global, Prowess NSE, then Prowess BSE. If returns are available from
only one source, or the di¤erence(s) between the multiple sources all exceed 5% then we
compare price returns from each source with price returns from NSDL, We then use total
returns from the source for which price returns most closely match NSDL price returns,
provided the discrepancy is less than 5%.
After selecting total returns, we drop extended zero-return periods which appear for non-
traded securities. We also drop rst (partial) month returns on IPOs and re-listings, which
are reported inconsistently. For the 25 highest and lowest remaining total monthly returns,
10Around dematerialisation, securitiesISINs change, with some data linked to pre-dematerialisation ISINs
and other data linked to post-dematerialisation ISINs. We use a matching routine and manual inspection to
match multiple ISINs for the same security.
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we use internet sources such as Moneycontrol and Economic Times to conrm that the
returns are indeed valid. The resulting data coverage is spotty for the very smallest equity
issues, which could lead to survivorship issues. Therefore, in computing account returns we
stock-months where the aggregate holdings of that stock across all account types in NSDL
is less than 500 million Rs (approximately $10 million) at the end of the prior month.
We follow a similar verication routine for market capitalization and book value, conrm-
ing that the values used are within 5% of that reported by another source. Where market
capitalization cannot be determined for a given month, we extrapolate it from the previous
month using price returns. Where book value is unknown, we extrapolate it forward using
the most recent observation over the past year.
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Dependent Variable:
1000 x Portfolio 
Weight (Old 
minus New)
Contribution to 
Difference in 
Returns (bp/mo)
1000 x Portfolio 
Weight (Old 
minus New)
Contribution to 
Difference in 
Returns (bp/mo)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
-0.603 0.79 -0.656 0.78
(0.420) (1.99) (0.420) (2.04)
-0.555 -0.14 -0.230 -2.60
(0.274) (2.22) (0.223) (2.33)
0.337 3.92 0.238 3.24
(0.100) (1.65) (0.113) (1.57)
0.077 2.24 0.046 1.62
(0.170) (1.00) (0.158) (0.92)
-0.972 10.29 -0.988 8.19
(0.186) (2.30) (0.186) (1.99)
-0.673 1.33 -0.639 1.17
(0.248) (3.79) (0.218) (3.66)
0.769 2.01 0.770 2.05
(0.228) (3.45) (0.226) (3.47)
0.493 1.77 -0.114 2.24
(0.121) (4.53) (0.080) (3.16)
-12.690 -0.53
(3.108) (1.95)
22.20 16.17
(6.78) (6.70)
6.78 6.57
(13.04) (14.11)
-1.82 -1.80
(11.72) (16.50)
11.52 17.74
(18.37) (19.72)
38.67 38.67
(26.94) (26.94)
Stock characteristic selection
Additional stock selection
Additional stock timing
Total difference in old and new 
account returns
Stock turnover
Beneficial ownership
Institutional ownership
Ln(1+stock age)
Large IPOs (market cap if age<1 
year)
Stock characteristic timing
Table 5: Decomposition of the Difference in Returns on Old and New Accounts
For the period January 2004 through January 2012, a zero-cost portfolio is formed which buys the each stock in proportion to its 
average weight in the oldest quintile of accounts and sells each stock in proportion to its average weight in the newest quintile of 
accounts. Stocks with market capitalization below 500 million Rs (approximately $10 million) are excluded during formation of the 
portfolio, leaving 2,677 stocks j in the sample. Columns [1] and [3] report the time-series average of coefficients, φbar, from the Fama 
MacBeth regression Wjt=φtXjt+εjt of portfolio weights W on the set X of cross-sectionally de-meaned stock characteristics below. 
Normalized rank transforms are used to measure market capitalization, book-market, prior returns (momentum), turnover, and 
beneficial and institutional ownership shares. In columns [2] and [4], we decompose the returns in the zero-cost portfolio. Total returns 
on the zero-cost portfolio are first broken into timing effects {ΣjWjtRjt-ΣjWbar,jRbar,j} and selection effects {ΣjWbar,jRbar,j}. To decompose 
timing and selection effects, we run Fama MacBeth regressions of returns on stock characteristics {Rjt=ψtXjt+ηjt}. Selection effects are 
decomposed into "stock characteristic selection" {Σj(φbarXbar,j)'(ψbarXbar,j)} and "additional stock selection" {Σjεbar,jηbar,j} effects. We 
further decompose the "stock characteristic selection" effect into components attributed to marginal returns associated with each stock 
characteristic c {Σjψbar,cxbar,c,j(φbarXbar,j)}. Timing effects are decomposed into "stock characteristic timing" {Σj[(φtXjt)'(ψtXjt)-
(φbarXbar,j)'(ψbarXbar,j)]} and "additional stock timing" {Σj(εjtηjt-εbar,jηbar,j)}, where the t-subscriped coefficients are from the cross-
sectional regressions run in Fama MacBeth estimation. Standard errors given in ( ) are computed by bootstrap, with standard errors in 
the top half of columns [2] and [4] accounting for the uncertainty in coefficients in columns [1] and [3]. Coefficients statistically 
significant at the five and ten percent level are indicated by bold and italicized type respectively.
Market beta
Market capitalization
Book-market
Momentum (t-2:t-12 returns)
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Dependent Variable:
Mean:
Specification: [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2][A] Linear Age 
Effect
0.57 -0.08 -1.31 -1.39 -9.33 -6.05
(0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (1.07) (0.68)
-5.58 -6.18 0.80 0.60 -1.48 -4.42
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (1.52) (1.27)
Incremental R
2
0.0027 0.0001 0.0250 0.0282 0.0051 0.0021
0.36 -1.09 -5.59 -5.21 -29.94 -19.05
(0.22) (0.18) (0.27) (0.24) (2.97) (2.17)
-5.40 -6.12 1.08 0.69 -0.76 -4.14
(0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (1.52) (1.26)
Incremental R
2
0.0000 0.0000 0.0349 0.0346 0.0056 0.0023
Log(Account Value)
44.72% 5.06% 124.18
Table 7: Account Age Effects in Individuals' Equity Investing Behavior
Idiosyncratic Share of 
Portfolio Variance (%) Monthly Turnover (%)
Disposition Bias - 
ln(PGR/PLR) x 100
Results are constructed from the subsample of data used in Table 4 where the equity investing behaviors are measurable. About 3.3 
million account-months are used in the idiosyncratic variance share and turnover regressions, and about 400 thousand in the 
disposition bias regressions (disposition bias is only defined for account months in which there are both gains and losses, and 
trading occurs). Specification [1] is (Yit-Yt)=β(Ait-At)+λ(Vit-Vt)+si+εit, and specification [2] is Yit=δt+βAit+λVit+θCi+εit, where Yit 
represents the indicated behavior of investor i in month t and V is log account value from the end of the previous month 
(winsorized below at 10,000Rs or about $200). See Table 4 for definitions of other terms. Panel regressions are run using weights 
that account for sampling probability and further apply equal weight to each cross-section (month). Standard errors in ( ) are 
computed from bootstraps of monthly data. Coefficients that are significant at a five percent level are in bold type, and coefficients 
that are significant at a ten percent level are in italics. Incremental R-squared is the ratio of the variance of the fitted age effects to 
the variance of the dependent variable.
Age
Age
Log(Account Value)
[B] Age Effect=Age
1/2
42
[1] [2]
4.15 3.92
(0.32) (0.32)
-13.23
(1.55)
Y Y
Y Y
[1] [2]
3.81 3.20
(0.39) (0.37)
0.75
(0.11)
-14.41
(1.20)
Y Y
Y Y
[1] [2]
6.46 8.45
(6.48) (6.56)
14.21
(3.44)
-17.63
(17.57)
Y Y
Y Y
Age Effects: (Account Age)
1/2
Log(Account Value)
Age Effects: (Account Age)
1/2
Log(Account Value)
[C] Dependent Variable: Disposition Bias - ln(PGR/PLR) x 100 (Mean=35.52)
Feedback 
Measures 
Cumulative increase in returns 
due to selling off gains versus 
losses
Cumulative outperformance 
relative to the market
Size of worst monthly stock 
portfolio return experienced
Age Effects: (Account Age)
1/2
Log(Account Value)
[B] Dependent Variable: Monthly Turnover 
Feedback 
Measures
Cumulative increase in returns 
due to trades
Cumulative outperformance 
relative to the market
Size of worst monthly stock 
portfolio return experienced
Table 8: Response of Individual Investor Behavior to Feedback
Results are constructed from the random sample used in Table 4. The specification tested is (Yit-Yt)=β(Ait-
At)+λ(Vit-Vt)+η(Fit-Ft)+si+εit. The si are account fixed effects and the terms Y, A, V, and F are cross-sectionally 
de-meaned account behavior, square root of account age, log account value (winsorized below at 10,000Rs or 
about $200), and the feedback measures used below. The increase in returns due to trades for a given month is 
computed as the difference between actual returns in the current month and the returns that would have obtained 
if no trades had been made in the past three months. The cumulative value of this measure is used below. The 
cumulative increase in returns due to selling off gains versus losses is computed by comparing the three-month 
returns following past sales with market returns over that period, with each gain and loss weighted in proportion 
to the value of the sale relative to the investor's stock portfolio and the outperformance of gains counting 
negatively in the measure. All feedback measures are defined such that positive coefficients indicate that the 
feedback reinforces in the given behavior. Panel regressions use weights that account for sampling probability 
and further apply equal weight to each cross-section (month). Standard errors in ( ) are computed from bootstraps 
of monthly data. Coefficients that are significant at a five percent level are in bold type, and coefficients that are 
significant at a ten percent level are in italics.
[A] Dependent Variable: Idiosyncratic Share of 
Feedback 
Measures
Cumulative outperformance 
relative to the market
Size of worst monthly stock 
portfolio return experienced
43
[1] [2] [3]
1.85 1.21 0.13
(0.55) (0.57) (0.26)
0.93 -0.63
(0.82) (0.29)
-1.75 -0.89
(0.51) (0.32)
-0.11 -0.26
(0.48) (0.32)
0.22
(1.22)
-1.51
(1.56)
3.84
(0.64)
3.20
(0.63)
-1.52
(0.39)
-0.67
(0.42)
-0.75
(0.63)
0.06
(0.11)
Stock turnover
Beneficial 
ownership
Institutional 
ownership
Ln(1+stock age)
Stock 
Characteristics
Market beta
Market 
capitalization
Book-market
Momentum
Table 9: Predicting Indian Stock Returns Using Characteristics of Investors
The dependent variable is monthly stock returns from January 2004 through September 2011 for each of 3,614 stocks 
with at least 10 individual investors from our sample individual accounts. Stockholder account age is the average 
account age of investors in the stock in the given month. For behavioral characteristics of stockholders, we similarly 
use the average behavior of across individual investors, where the behavior from a given individual investor is taken 
as the cumulative average of a cross-sectionally de-meaned measure of the behavior (idiosyncratic share of portfolio 
variance, monthly turnover, or ln(PGR/PLR)). Average investor account age and behavior measures, as well as 
market capitalization, book-market, momentum, turnover, and beneficial and institutional ownership share measures 
are converted to normalized rank form. The regressions below are carried out by the Fama MacBeth procedure, and a 
serial correlation adjustment (Newey West, 3 monthly lags) is applied. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for 
readability, and statistical significant at the five and ten percent level are indicated by bold and italicized type 
respectively.
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Figure 6: Simulated Cumulative Change in Investor Behaviors from Age 
Effects and Feedback 
10th, Median, and 90th Percentile of Accounts Opened Dec. 2003 
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These figures are produced using  age and feedback coefficients in specifications [b] of Table 8 combined with the actual age and feedback 
received by individual investor accounts opened in December 2003. This feedack consists of cumulative market outperformance and worst 
monthly return experienced,  return improvement due to trading (turnover plot), and return improvement due to selling gains versus losses 
(disposition bias plot). 
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